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The Dynamics of Deposit Euroization in European  
Post-transition Countries: Evidence from Threshold VAR 
 
Abstract: 
This paper investigates determinants of deposit euroization (DE) in twelve European post-
transition economies using both linear and threshold models. Results suggest that 
exchange rates and interest rate differentials are important for explaining DE. Results for 
the two countries with the highest macroeconomic and institutional credibility and flexible 
exchange rate regimes, the Czech Republic and Poland, suggest no evidence of threshold 
effects, while for other countries threshold behavior was found. Threshold VAR results 
indicate depreciations have a stronger effect on DE than appreciations, while interest rate 
spreads widen more after exchange rate depreciations than after appreciations. Moreover, 
we found evidence that DE changes more strongly after interest rate differentials increase 
than after they decrease. 
 
Keywords: cointegration, deposit euroization, transition, threshold VAR 
JEL classification: C32, E44, E58, F31, F41 
 
 
 
Dinamika depozitne eurizacije u europskim posttranzicijskim  
zemljama: sluèaj VAR-a s ukljuèenim pragom 
 
Saetak: 
U èlanku se koriste linearni modeli te modeli s ukljuèenim pragom pomoæu kojih se 
istrauju determinante depozitne eurizacije (DE) na uzorku 12 europskih posttranzicijskih 
zemalja. Rezultati pokazuju da su valutni teèajevi i kamatni diferencijali vani za 
objašnjavanje DE. Opaa se da Èeška i Poljska, dvije zemlje s najvišom razinom 
makroekonomskog i institucionalnog kredibiliteta te plutajuæim teèajnim reimom, ne 
pokazuju nelinearni obrazac ponašanja dok se kod ostalih zemalja ti obrasci pronalaze. VAR 
s ukljuèenim pragom upuæuje na to da teèajne deprecijacije imaju snaniji utjecaj na DE 
nego teèajne aprecijacije, dok se kamatni diferencijali više proširuju nakon teèajne 
deprecijacije nego nakon teèajne aprecijacije. Povrh toga, promjene DE mnogo su veæe 
nakon širenja kamatnih diferencijala nego nakon njihova suavanja. 
 
Kljuène rijeèi: kointegracija, depozitna eurizacija, tranzicija, VAR s ukljuèenim pragom 
JEL klasifikacija: C32, E44, E58, F31, F41 
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1 Introduction 
 
In the late eighties and early nineties high inflation dominated European transition 
countries. In order to restrain inflation expectations that were tied to exchange rate 
movements, central banks preferred to use the exchange rate as the nominal anchor 
(Mishkin, 2000; Frankel, 2010). However, long after macroeconomic stability had been 
achieved, due to significant “fear of floating”, exchange rate based monetary regimes 
continued to persist as an optimal policy choice for many European post-transition 
countries still pursuing currency boards, pegs, fixed, managed or even dirty floating 
exchange rate regimes.  
 
As discussed in Calvo and Reinhart (2002), fear of floating is manifested as central banks’ 
reluctance to allow the exchange rate to adjust significantly and rapidly, resulting in 
episodes of central bank interventions aimed at avoiding major devaluation shifts. 
Economic agents therefore anticipate exchange rate stability and eventually create very high 
levels of unofficial dollarization1 (Levy Yeyati, 2003). Unlike adopting the euro as the 
official currency (known as official euroization), unofficial euroization is a result of 
voluntarily using foreign currency for different money functions: either the medium-of-
exchange function that leads to currency substitution or the store-of-value function leading 
to asset substitution (Feige and Dean, 2002). The term asset substitution has been replaced 
by financial euroization (FE), defined as residents’ holding of a significant share of assets or 
liabilities in foreign currency (Ize and Levy Yeyati, 2003). FE can be divided into deposit 
euroization (DE) and credit euroization (CE) with DE reflecting the propensity of the 
private and public sector to hold deposits in foreign currency and CE a result of 
commercial banks’ propensity to grant loans in foreign currency or indexed to foreign 
currency. 
 
It is argued that high levels of FE limit the choices for monetary policy-makers since large 
exchange rate depreciations increase the cost of servicing foreign currency denominated 
debt and severely affect probabilities of default (Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano, 2003). As 
a result, central banks respond with a myriad of managed exchange rate regimes biased to 
depreciation. In line with that, FE indirectly affects the performance of all sectors of the 
economy, not just monetary policy. For example, Chang and Velasco (2000) find that 
detaining depreciation eventually pushes output down, Cabral (2010) warns of larger 
employment losses under “fear of floating” and Tsangarides (2010) reports that pegs have 
been recovering much slower than floaters in the latest 2010-2011 recovery phase. 
Although FE is a relevant economic policy issue, we still lack knowledge about the 
phenomenon, its determinants and influences on the economy. Especially now when an 
explosion of public debt in some CEE (Central and East European) countries like Hungary 
will make Maastricht criteria unreachable and therefore euro adoption impossible. That 
scenario leaves countries without the obvious exit strategy for dealing with FE – official 
                                                 
1 Throughout the text, the term euroization will be used instead of dollarization as suggested by Feige and Dean (2002). 
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euro adoption. In order to ensure financial and economic stability, it is important to 
understand what drives FE and how exactly it affects the economy. 
 
Experiences from European post-transition economies show that FE decreases very slowly 
in periods of macroeconomic stability but increases swiftly in periods of economic 
uncertainty. In addition, exchange rate depreciations seem to affect FE strongly and 
quickly, while the opposite exchange rate changes have a much more moderate impact. 
This sort of FE development mimics regime dynamics, in which a variable reacts in one 
way when above some threshold and in a different manner when below the threshold. One 
possible explanation for threshold effects is the presence of transaction costs, where 
changing the currency structure of deposits or loans is time-consuming and usually comes 
with an expense. For example, switching foreign currency deposits to domestic currency 
deposits might be protracted if those deposits are agreed not to be withdrawn before a 
certain period of time elapses unless a penalty is paid. Although threshold or nonlinear 
effects might describe FE dynamics in partially euroized economies, no research regarding 
this issue has been carried out. In order to fill this gap, we test for the presence of threshold 
effects of deposit euroization. We investigate DE dynamics in twelve Central, Baltic and 
Southeastern European countries that record very high levels of financial euroization. Our 
model incorporates DE and two monetary variables recognized as DE drivers in the 
literature, the interest rate differential and the exchange rate. We would like to show how 
DE reacts to changes in those monetary variables and how those responses differ depending 
on the level of DE and the exchange rate regime in the observed country. For each of these 
cases and countries we will apply TVAR (threshold vector autoregression) which is 
applicable to both the linear and the nonlinear model (Koop, Pesaran and Potter, 1996; 
Balke, 2000). Namely, we will derive generalized impulse response functions that vary in 
sign and magnitude and allow regimes to switch after a shock. The goal of this research is 
to answer two policy questions. Specifically, we aim to explore how exchange rate changes, 
more precisely, exchange rate depreciations affect DE in an economy with a high level of 
DE. We expect to show there are nonlinearities in the DE response to exchange rate 
changes – stronger DE responses to depreciations than to appreciations. If those 
nonlinearities exist, we will investigate how they differ with respect to the prevailing 
exchange rate regime. In line with that, we expect stronger DE reactions to exchange rate 
depreciations than to appreciations in countries with fixed or managed floating exchange 
rate regimes. 
 
The analysis will contribute to the existing field of knowledge in several ways. Firstly, it will 
give new insights into the dynamics, characteristics and consequences of DE in European 
post-transition economies. In order to depict the relationships between euroization and the 
monetary system, we model monetary determinants of DE. We give special attention to the 
influence of the prevailing exchange rate regime on the level of DE since research shows 
there is a strong link between the two. As far as we know, there are no studies on FE 
determinants that use TVAR methodology. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one 
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paper by Ivanov, Tkalec and Vizek (2011) that tests for nonlinear or threshold effects of FE 
in Croatia. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents an overview 
of the existing empirical literature with an emphasis on the results for FE in European post-
transition countries rather than financial dollarization in Latin America. Sections three and 
four describe the applied methodology and data. Results of the empirical analysis are given 
in section five while the last section concludes the paper. 
 
 
2 Literature 
 
While there is no normative consensus on the effect of FE on the economy, researchers find 
that the relationship between the level of FE and monetary policy, trade balance and 
consequently output is an important one. In much of the recent literature on FE, the focus 
lies on detecting the determinants of euroization and the effects it has on the conduct of 
monetary policy. In the eighties and early nineties, unofficial euroization was considered a 
consequence of high inflation rates and low credibility of monetary authorities, as discussed 
in Levy Yeyati (2003). However, even after inflation moderated and the economy 
stabilized, euroization persisted (Kokenyne, Ley and Veyrune, 2010). The existing 
literature offers several explanations for the observed FE persistence phenomenon and Levy 
Yeyati (2006) summarizes them into the currency substitution view, the portfolio view, the 
market failure view, and the institutional view. 
 
The currency substitution view explains FE as an outcome of a negative relationship 
between demand for local currency and the rate of inflation (Savastano, 1996; Baliño, 
Bennett and Borensztein, 1999; De Nicoló, Honohan and Ize, 2005). The portfolio view, 
also known as the optimal (minimum variance) portfolio, explains that high FE levels 
persist (even after prices stabilize) whenever the expected volatility of the inflation rate 
remains high in relation to that of the real exchange rate (Ize and Levy Yeyati, 2003). This 
theoretical explanation assumes that uncovered interest rate parity holds given the real 
returns on different currencies. In short, if the variance of domestic inflation increases 
relative to the variance of real depreciation, the local currency becomes less attractive and 
FE increases.2 The market failure view points out that the level of FE increases when 
market participants freely borrow and lend in foreign currency without considering major 
depreciation exchange rate risks. The behavior is facilitated by central banks’ commitment 
to maintaining a stable exchange rate that creates a lower risk of borrowing and lending in 
foreign currency and hence increases moral hazard and asymmetric information in the 
system. Lastly, the institutional view explains how FE rises when economic policy-makers 
build their credibility on a stable exchange rate rather than on a strong institutional 
framework or regulations that favor domestic currency. Such institutional imperfections 
                                                 
2 This minimum variance theory is discussed also in De Nicoló, Honohan and Ize (2005). 
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not only increase FE but also the cost of exchange rate depreciation that in turn leads to an 
even stronger commitment of policy-makers (Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano, 2003; De 
Nicoló, Honohan and Ize, 2005; Rajan and Tokatlidis, 2005). When testing for these 
theories empirically, Levy Yeyati (2003) finds that minimum variance portfolio is positively 
related,3 while average past inflation and GDP are negatively related to DE. 
 
The literature typically deals with dollarization in Latin America and determinants 
characteristic for that region, but in the last few years one witnesses a growing body of 
research on euroization in European post-transition countries. Therefore, a number of 
more recent studies on post-transition economies identify exchange rates, especially 
exchange rate volatility, and interest rate differentials as determinants of FE. A growing area 
of research considers financial integration, foreign bank presence and the accumulation of 
foreign liabilities as important drivers of FE in transition economies. Most of the research 
studies a pool of countries using panel data analysis and interprets the results for the region 
as a whole, sometimes without considering country-specific features. For example, 
Kokenyne, Ley and Veyrune (2010) find a positive link between the real exchange rate and 
DE and a negative effect of increasing exchange rate volatility on both foreign exchange 
deposits and loans. Basso, Calvo-Gonzales and Jurgilas (2011) show the interest rate 
differential has a negative effect on DE while access to foreign funds increases CE, but at 
the same time decreases DE. Similarly, Piontkovsky (2003) shows that relative returns on 
assets, defined as bank deposits in the domestic currency relative to deposits in foreign 
currencies, have a significant effect on the level of FE. Rosenberg and Tirpák (2008) find 
that rising interest rate differentials, foreign funding and openness promote CE. Luca and 
Petrova (2008) contradict the findings of Basso, Calvo-Gonzales and Jurgilas (2011) since 
they empirically show a positive relationship between the interest rate differentials and DE 
and a negative relationship between exchange rate volatility and DE. Since their research is 
more focused on CE rather than DE, Luca and Petrova (2008) describe banks’ “matching 
behavior” and stress the role of foreign banks in driving foreign currency holdings in 
transition economies. In a panel of more than a hundred countries, Carranza, Cayo and 
Galdón-Sanchez (2003) confirm that large depreciations have a negative effect on the pass-
through coefficient, with the impact being higher the greater the level of euroization. They 
also show that the exchange rate regime is important since countries with fixed exchange 
rates suffer larger balance-sheet effects after depreciations.4 Moreover, they argue that large 
exchange rate depreciations can trigger a nonlinear effect on the balance sheet. Besides 
those FE drivers, panel data analysis results add some other FE determinants, such as 
increased access to global capital markets (Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano, 2003), closeness 
to the European Union (European Central Bank, 2010; Neanidis, 2010) and country size 
(Rosenberg and Tirpák, 2008). 
 
                                                 
3 Confirmed in Basso, Calvo-Gonzales and Jurgilas (2011). 
4 A contrary view is expressed in Arteta (2005a, 2005b) in which floating regimes seem to be the ones that encourage 
dollarization. In addition, there is no evidence that currency crashes are more costly in highly dollarized economies. 
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Research using time series methods country-by-country is scarce when compared to panel 
data analysis results summarized above. Feige (2003) and Levy Yeyati (2003) claim that 
underdeveloped domestic financial markets are in part responsible for high FE levels in 
some countries. Ozsoz, Rengifo and Salvatore (2008) estimate the probability of foreign 
currency intervention in five euroized post-transition economies using a volatility measure 
of the local exchange rate. Thereby, they demonstrate that central bank behavior is 
predetermined by the level of euroization. Lastly, only one study deals with micro data in 
European post-transition economies. Stix (2011) finds that remittances and income from 
tourism can have a significant impact on currency substitution in some post-transition 
economies and that underdevelopment of domestic financial markets drives FE. 
 
Nevertheless, within the vast literature on euroization and related topics, these relationships 
are usually analyzed as part of a linear model. Although persistence of FE and observed 
“fear of floating” in many post-transition economies imply a nonlinear relationship 
between the level of FE and the exchange rate, to the best of our knowledge there are only 
two studies that model FE using a nonlinear framework, but neither of these studies models 
the responses of FE to exchange rate changes and FE feedback effects. These two studies are 
Heimonen (2001) and Ivanov, Tkalec and Vizek (2011). Heimonen (2001) analyzes 
euroization in Estonia and uses threshold cointegration to estimate portfolio shifts between 
two substitute currencies, euros and dollars. However, his study does not deal with FE 
determinants nor does it consider substitution between foreign and domestic currency. 
Ivanov, Tkalec and Vizek (2011) explore FE in Croatia using single equation threshold 
cointegration. They build different models using a great number of variables and find that 
nominal exchange rate changes have a strong effect on DE and that CE is affected by 
banks’ foreign-currency-structure matching behavior. Moreover, they find threshold effects 
for both DE and CE. However, their research does not consider the possibility of diverse 
FE responses to exchange rate appreciations/depreciations nor do they consider interest rate 
differentials as a determinant of euroization.  
 
Additionally, the importance of nonlinear FE behavior is clearly recognized by several 
studies applying a linear modelling framework, within which limited nonlinear FE features 
are incorporated. Thus both Rennhack and Nozaki (2006) and Neanidis and Savva (2009) 
use an index of asymmetry of exchange rate movements. The latter study finds positive 
short-run effects of depreciations decrease with the level of euroization because 
depreciations induce depositors to change their currency compositions in favor of foreign 
currencies.  
 
 
3 The Data 
 
We model DE with three variables using VAR and threshold VAR methodology with DE 
defined as the share of deposits in foreign currency (or indexed to foreign currency, where 
available) in total deposits. Although the most accurate way to measure DE is by surveys 
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that collect data on a wide range of assets and liabilities in foreign currency, the problem is 
that those surveys either have a very short data span or are conducted on a very small 
number of countries. Therefore, if one wants to study DE behavior across time, the 
alternative is to use banks’ aggregate balance sheet data that provide only levels of time and 
savings’ deposits in foreign currency. Although DE is not a perfect measure of financial 
euroization because it incorporates only the liabilities side of banks’ accounts, it still reflects 
differences in unofficial euroization between countries. Other authors also prefer DE as a 
proxy for financial euroization (Baliño, Bennett and Borensztein, 1999; Levy Yeyati, 2003; 
Piontkovsky, 2003; Arteta, 2005a; Neanidis and Savva, 2009; Stix, 2011). 
 
We include only three variables simply due to pragmatic reasons. As the number of 
coefficients in the linearity test and TVAR rises with the number of variables, the test size 
and power decrease. There is a long list of euroization drivers, but we are interested in those 
variables that capture the influence of monetary policy on DE. The most important 
variables that seem to affect deposit euroization and derive from the monetary system are 
the exchange rate and the interest rate differential. The exchange rate influences deposits 
when confidence in the domestic currency is low. If investors expect the exchange rate to 
depreciate, they will save in foreign rather than in domestic currency. Therefore, it is 
justifiable to expect a change in investor behavior that is caused by a reaction to nominal 
exchange rate changes. The variable we included in our model is the level of the bilateral 
exchange rate of the domestic currency to the euro calculated as a monthly average. 
However, for countries that have a fixed exchange rate regime, the real effective exchange 
rate was used instead. The interest rate differential is calculated as the difference between 
domestic and euro-area interest rates, where the domestic rate is either the 3-month money 
market interest rate or a short-run deposit rate and the euro-area rate is the 3-month 
money market interest rate. While the domestic interest rate reflects central bank activity 
and even monetary policy stance, the interest rate differential reflects a number of possible 
situations, from arbitrage opportunities and foreign capital inflow to perceived country risk 
and even high inflation rates. In addition to these two explanatory variables, we also need a 
threshold variable in order to distinguish between regimes in the nonlinear specification. In 
our case, this is an endogenous variable – deposit euroization. Since post-transition 
economies vary in their DE level, it seems plausible to take that variable as a reliable 
threshold in order to control for the level of euroization. 
 
We investigate twelve post-transition European countries with their samples varied across 
countries. Those countries are Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Turkey. The longest data span 
is for Croatia – 1995:07 to 2010:11 or 185 observations – and the shortest for Macedonia 
– 2005:01 to 2010:12 or 72 observations. A short description of prevailing exchange rate 
regimes, DE levels and figures for each country can be found in Appendix I. Data are 
compiled from central bank statistics and Eurostat with a detailed description presented in 
Appendix II. All data are seasonally adjusted, with both the deposit euroization and the 
exchange rate in logarithms. In order to achieve stationarity, we take the first differences 
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and test the series with augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root methodology. Results presented 
in Table 1 show all series are stationary in first differences. 
 
Table 1  ADF Test for First Differences 
 Lags (AIC) 
t-value 
(ADF) 
t-value 
(lag) AIC  
Lags 
(AIC) 
t-value 
(ADF) 
t-value 
(lag) AIC 
DE 0 -6.053*** - -9.005 DE 2 -4.491*** 0.0019 -8.765 
NER 1 -5.965*** 0.0089 -8.637 RER 1 -7.503*** 0.0078 -11.020 Belarus 
IRD 1 -3.163** 0.0951 -11.860 
Lithuania 
IRD 0 -6.439*** - -2.055 
DE 2 -3.853*** 0.0430 -10.520 DE 0 -4.408*** - -10.520 
RER 4 -4.052** 0.0345 -2.915 RER 0 -6.704*** - -11.580 Bulgaria 
IRD 4 -4.073** 0.0334 -13.810 
Macedonia 
IRD 0 -3.372** - -2.438 
DE 3 -3.559*** 0.0705 -11.690 DE 1 -9.438*** 0.0942 -8.979 
NER 1 -9.669*** 0.0379 -11.690 NER 0 -7.502*** - -9.249 Croatia 
IRD 2 -7.737*** 0.0674 -0.511 
Poland 
IRD 0 -6.106*** - -2.780 
DE 1 -10.480*** 0.0355 -8.244 DE 2 -3.000** 0.0389 -9.179 
NER 6 -4.710*** 0.0013 -10.220 NER 0 -4.998*** - -9.633 Czech R. 
IRD 1 -6.338*** 0.0771 -3.990 
Romania 
IRD 4 -2.975** 0.5543 0.285 
DE 0 -13.730*** - -8.342 DE 0 -10.260*** - -10.360 
NER 1 -7.747*** 0.0422 -9.675 NER 0 -5.120** - -10.100 Hungary 
IRD 0 -8.626*** - -1.028 
Serbia 
IRD 0 -7.997*** - -2.230 
DE 8 -3.543*** 0.0378 -11.350 DE 0 -8.245*** - -9.406 
RER 2 -3.134** 0.0283 -10.970 NER 1 -6.359*** 0.1119 -8.570 Latvia 
IRD 11 -3.557*** 0.5275 0.919 
Turkey 
IRD 1 -7.444*** 0.0007 -0.672 
 
Notes: ADF – augmented Dickey-Fuller; DE – deposit euroization; NER – nominal exchange rate; RER – real 
exchange rate; IRD – interest rate differential; constant included; maximum number of lags used is 18; optimal time 
lag chosen according to AIC – Akaike information criterion; all series are seasonally adjusted and in logarithms 
(except for the interest rate differential); *** null hypothesis about existence of unit root rejected at the 1 percent level 
of significance; ** hypothesis about existence of unit root rejected at the 5 percent level of significance. 
 
 
4 Methodology 
 
Baseline Linear Model 
 
Before conducting any kind of nonlinear modelling, we first need to specify a linear model. 
The most usual way to determine the effects that shocks have on a number of endogenous 
variables is to set up a VAR model. Normally, VAR is specified in the following form: 
 
0 1 1 ...t t j t j ty y y u− −= Γ + Γ + + Γ +  (1) 
 
where ( ) '1 ,...,t t kty y y=  is a vector of k endogenous variables. 0Γ  is a k-dimensional vector 
including deterministic terms like a constant, a linear trend or even dummy variables, while 
the iΓ  coefficient matrix with i=1,…,j captures short-run dynamic effects. Finally, tu  is a 
sequence of serially uncorrelated random variables with mean zero and a constant positive 
variance-covariance matrix. If the variables are nonstationary, we can rewrite the VAR 
model in vector error-correction form: 
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1
1
0 1 1
j
i
t t t i ty b b t y y uδ
−
=
+ − −Δ = + Π + Δ +∑  (2) 
 
where 'αβΠ =  is a matrix representing cointegrating equations with β  referring to 
cointegrating coefficients and α  to loading coefficients. More specifically, 1jm iiI =Π = − Γ∑  
and 1
j
i iiδ == − Γ∑ . 0b  and 1b  are 1k ×  vectors and t denotes a time trend that can be 
included in the cointegrating equations. It follows that y is cointegrated of rank r if there 
exist r linearly independent vectors in matrix β  and if ' tyβ  is a stationary process. If there 
is a cointegrating relationship, α  and β  will be ( k r× ) matrices of rank r (Engle and 
Granger, 1987). 
 
 
The Threshold VAR Model 
 
The baseline linear model is misspecified when the variables actually follow a nonlinear 
process. Therefore, we expand the model by building a threshold vector autoregressive 
(TVAR) specification. TVAR is a simple way of capturing nonlinearities suggested in a 
number of economic and monetary policy models like Teräsvirta and Anderson (1992), 
Holmes and Wang (2000) and Balke (2000). The nonlinear character of TVAR models 
comes from a transition variable that separates the baseline VAR into different regimes 
(Hansen, 1996, 1997; Tsay, 1998). Each regime is then given a different autoregressive 
matrix and described as a linear model, but taken together those regime-based linear 
models describe a nonlinear process.5 A VAR model adjusted for the threshold specification 
then becomes: 
 
1 2 *t t t t d ty X X I z z u−= Γ + Γ ≥ +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (3) 
 
where 1(1, ,..., ) 't t t jX y y− −= . Similarly, the vector error-correction model (VECM) is 
described by the following equation: 
 
1 2 *
v v v v
t t t t d ty X X I z z u−Δ = Γ + Γ ≥ +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (4) 
 
with 1 1 1(1, ' , ..., ) '
v
t t t t jX y y yβ − − − += Δ Δ . As usual, gamma matrices are coefficient matrices 
and tu  is the error matrix. The threshold variable is denoted by t dz −  with d being a 
possible time lag. In order to separate regimes, an indicator function I  equals 1 if the 
threshold variable t dz −  is above the chosen threshold value *z  and 0 otherwise. Both the 
threshold value *z  and the delay lag d are unknown parameters and have to be determined 
                                                 
5 The first threshold autoregressive methods were developed by Tong (1978, 1983, 1990) who approximated a nonlinear 
autoregressive structure by a threshold autoregression (TAR) with a small number of regimes. Later on, TAR was 
extended to a multivariate framework by Tsay (1998) and Hansen (1996, 1997). A number of studies for monetary policy 
shocks use TVAR methodology, including Balke (2000), Atanasova (2003), Calza and Sousa (2006) and Jääskelä (2007). 
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together with other parameters. According to Hansen (1996, 1997), the transition variable 
can be either an endogenous or an exogenous variable. 
 
Before the TVAR estimation, the threshold model needs to be tested for linearity using the 
Hansen test (Hansen, 1996, 1997). If linearity is rejected, then the endogenously chosen 
threshold value separates the observations of the transition variable into different regimes 
that are described by a linear model. The methodology allows for more than one threshold 
value, namely more than two regimes, but we will focus on the two-regime case due to 
simplicity and short data spans. Since this study explores countries with perceived 
unofficial euroization, the most justifiable candidate for the threshold variable is the level of 
deposit euroization. That allows us to separate countries into different groups, based on the 
observed level of euroization. 
 
The Hansen linearity test requires the transition variable z  to be stationary with a 
continuous distribution 0 1 1... sz z z −−∞ = < < < < ∞  that is restricted to a bounded set 
[ ],Z z z= , with Z an interval on the full sample range of the transition variable. An interval 
on the transition variable is chosen to provide a minimum number of observations in each 
subsample and therefore ensures that the model is well identified for all possible values of 
*z . Before testing the threshold, the lag order j  and the threshold delay lag d  need to be 
determined. 
 
If we rewrite the equation for TVAR, we get the following specification: 
 
( ) 't t ty X z uδ= +  (5) 
 
with ' '( ) ( ) 't t tX z X X I=  and ' '1 2( ) 'δ = Γ Γ . Following Weise (1999), we employ a general 
specification and allow all coefficients in the lag polynomials to change across regimes. For 
each possible threshold value ,z  the equation is estimated using the method of least squares 
(LS) with the relevant estimation of δ  equal to: 
 
1
1 1
ˆ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ') ( ( ))
T T
t t t t
t t
z X z X z X z yδ −
= =
= ∑ ∑ . (6) 
 
The related residuals are then defined as ˆˆ ( ) ' ( )t t tu y X z zδ= −  and the residual variance as 
2 2
1
1ˆ ˆTT tt utσ == ∑ . For our threshold to be efficient we need the estimate of δ  that 
minimizes the residual variance. Since the minimal variance itself does not guarantee 
nonlinearity, Hansen developed an additional test. A pointwise F-statistic is a profound 
linearity test specified as: 
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2 2
2
sup ( )
ˆ ( )
ˆ ( )
T T
z Z
T T
T
T
F F z
zF T
z
σ σ
σ
∈
=
⎛ ⎞−= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
  (7) 
 
where the estimated residual variance of the corresponding linear model is denoted by 2Tσ . 
 
A problem arises with the distribution of the derived F-statistic that is not standard or chi-
square (Hansen, 1996) since the threshold value is not identified under the null of 
linearity. Therefore, it is necessary to approximate the asymptotic distribution using a 
bootstrap procedure. In order to obtain bootstrap F-statistics *TF , we need bootstrap 
residual variances * 2Tσ  and * 2ˆ ( )T zσ . To get those variances we take *ty  iid N(0,1) random 
draws and regress them on tX  and ( )tX z . Once we have the necessary inputs, the 
bootstrap F-statistic becomes: 
 
* *
* 2 * 2
*
* 2
sup ( )
ˆ ( )
.
ˆ ( )
T T
z Z
T T
T
T
F F z
zF T
z
σ σ
σ
∈
=
⎛ ⎞−= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
  (8) 
 
It is then possible to approximate the asymptotic null distribution of TF . Keeping in mind 
that the distribution of *TF  converges weakly in probability to the null distribution of TF  
under the alternative, the asymptotic bootstrap p-value can be derived. The percentage of 
bootstrap samples for which *T TF F>  gives the bootstrap p-value.6 
 
We test the null hypothesis of linearity against threshold nonlinearity allowing 
heteroscedasticity in the error terms. Our selection of the threshold value is conditional on 
the choice of a minimal variance-covariance matrix of the residuals. We generate 1000 
realizations of the F-statistics for each grid point and construct the empirical distribution to 
account for Hansen (1996). 
 
 
Generalized Impulse Response 
 
The main purpose of this empirical study is to detect how deposit euroization reacts to 
monetary variables, most importantly to exchange rate shocks. In order to understand the 
relationship between the level of DE, the exchange rate and the interest rate differential, we 
need to construct impulse responses for shocks in those two variables. To obtain 
meaningful impulse responses a structural identification is needed. The TVAR equation 
reveals 1Γ  and 2Γ  as “structural” contemporaneous relationships in the two regimes. 
                                                 
6 If one wants to account for heteroscedasticity, the standard F-statistic can be replaced by a heteroscedasticity-consistent 
Wald or Lagrange multiplier test. 
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Relying on Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), we also assume 1Γ  and 2Γ  have a 
recursive structure with a causal ordering of DE, the exchange rate and the interest rate 
differential. The recursiveness assumption is usually used to identify structural shocks in 
VAR models, especially for monetary and financial variables (Leeper, Sim and Zha, 1996; 
Bernanke, Gertler and Watson, 1997). We use this recursive identification because of its 
simplicity; using more complicated identification schemes would protract the estimation 
considerably. 
 
With a structural identification applied to the linear and nonlinear model, we can construct 
impulse responses (IR). While the linear case is straightforward, the nonlinear model 
requires further IR definitions that account for the nonlinearity of the system. First, the 
shock must depend on the entire history of the system before the point at which the shock 
occurs (Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen, 1993; Koop, 1996; Koop, Pesaran and Potter, 1996). 
Moreover, linear IR functions are inappropriate since they are history-independent, 
symmetric (i.e., negative shocks are exactly the opposite of positive shocks) and 
proportional to the size of a shock. In a nonlinear specification, we expect that the effect of 
a shock is not proportional to its size or direction and that it is history-dependent. To fulfil 
these three conditions, we use generalized impulse response functions (GIRF) that are 
applicable to both the linear and the nonlinear model.7 
 
Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) define GIRF as the difference between two conditional 
expectations with a single exogenous shock tε : 
 
1 1
1 1
| , 0,..., 0,
| 0, 0,..., 0,
t m t t t m t
t m t t t m t
GIRF E X
E X
ε ε ε
ε ε ε
+ + + −
+ + + −
= = = Ω −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
= = = Ω⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
 (9) 
 
where m  is the forecasting horizon and 1t−Ω  the history at time 1t − . As mentioned, GIRF 
provides different results for positive and negative shocks since it allows the regimes to 
switch after a shock. In our case, GIRF allows the shocks in the low euroization regime to 
differ from shocks in a high euroization regime. Since the computation of GIRF is not 
trivial, we describe the algorithm step-by-step in Appendix III. 
 
 
5 Estimation Results 
 
The three variables, deposit euroization (DE), the exchange rate (ER) and the interest rate 
differential (IRD), make the linear baseline reduced-form VAR model: 
 
t t ty X u= Γ +  (10) 
 
                                                 
7 Many empirical studies that describe nonlinearities use GIRF, for example Balke (2000), Atanasova (2003), Calza and 
Sousa (2006) and Jääskelä (2007). 
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where ( , , )DE ER IRDty = , , , ..., )0 1( jΓ = Γ Γ Γ  and 1(1, ,..., ) 't t t jX y y− −= . Using this baseline 
model, we determine the optimal lag length using different criteria. Time series for all 
countries are in first differences as suggested by the ADF test and presented in Table 2. For 
the linear model, the Schwarz criterion suggests one or two lags in all twelve countries, 
while Akaike and likelihood ratio criteria propose higher orders. Since every additional 
parameter decreases the power of estimation significantly (Hansen, 1996), it is 
recommended to choose a smaller number of lags. Using only one or two lags leads to 
frequent rejection of the null hypothesis of no serial correlation (as suggested by the 
portmanteau test), so we choose to use three lags for the estimation of the nonlinear model. 
This structure still gives us good estimation power and better autocorrelation properties. 
 
 
Cointegration 
 
After defining the baseline model, we can determine the number of cointegrating relations 
between the series. Analysis of the cointegration rank and cointegrating matrix β  is 
conducted using Johansen’s likelihood ratio procedure (Johansen, 1991, 1995). The 
deterministic term appears significant for all countries except for Poland and the Czech 
Republic, while in the case of Lithuania we also needed to include a linear trend term. The 
results for trace and maximum eigenvalue tests are presented in Table 3. For Belarus, 
Macedonia, Romania and Serbia both tests reject cointegration implying that either there is 
no relationship between the variables or that the linear model is misspecified and a 
nonlinear model should be used instead. For all other countries both tests show there is one 
cointegrating relation.8 However, linearity is misspecified in countries for which we 
confirm nonlinearity in the second step, so we present results for the Czech Republic and 
Poland only. Namely, those two countries are the only ones that confirm cointegration and 
at the same time do not witness threshold effects. Resulting cointegrating vectors for all 
countries can be found in Table 4. 
 
Table 2  Lag Length Selection Criteria 
Lag LR FPE AIC SIC HQ Lag LR FPE AIC SIC HQ 
Belarus Lithuania 
0 - 0.000 -13.412 -13.320 -13.375 0 - 0.000 -1.853 -1.788 -1.827 
1 575.188 0.000 -21.164 -20.796 -21.017 1 1253.95 0.000 -11.220 -10.963 -11.116 
2 68.033 0.000 -21.913 -21.269* -21.656* 2 50.554 0.000 -11.480 -11.030* -11.297* 
3 18.342* 0.000 -21.954 -21.034 -21.587 3 6.585 0.000 -11.399 -10.757 -11.138 
4 16.842 0.000* -21.985* -20.789 -21.507 4 21.785 0.000 -11.444 -10.609 -11.105 
Bulgaria 5 11.259 0.000 -11.406 -10.378 -10.988 
0 - 0.000 -7.397 -7.312 -7.363 6 19.321 0.000 -11.438 -10.218 -10.942 
1 698.151 0.000 -15.503 -15.166* -15.367* 7 36.693* 0.000* -11.628* -10.215 -11.054 
2 17.860 0.000 -15.519 -14.928 -15.281 8 7.623 0.000 -11.564 -9.958 -10.912 
 
 
                                                 
8 The only exception is the Czech Republic for which only the trace test implies one cointegrating relation, while the max 
test shows no cointegrating relation. 
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3 15.399 0.000 -15.512 -14.668 -15.172 Macedonia 
4 16.374 0.000* -15.526 -14.428 -15.084 0 - 0.000 -15.038 -14.936 -14.998 
5 6.400 0.000 -15.410 -14.059 -14.866 1 36.935* 0.000* -15.378* -14.970* -15.218* 
6 22.820 0.000 -15.536 -13.932 -14.890 2 10.374 0.000 -15.278 -14.563 -14.997 
7 6.227 0.000 -15.426 -13.568 -14.678 3 7.564 0.000 -15.135 -14.114 -14.733 
8 20.047* 0.000 -15.540* -13.429 -14.689 4 12.384 0.000 -15.097 -13.770 -14.575 
Croatia 5 13.717 0.000 -15.103 -13.470 -14.461 
0 - 0.000 -15.129 -15.075 -15.107 6 13.307 0.000 -15.120 -13.181 -14.357 
1 58.165 0.000 -15.365 -15.149* -15.278 7 5.618 0.000 -14.971 -12.726 -14.088 
2 31.921* 0.000* -15.452* -15.074 -15.298* 8 4.901 0.000 -14.814 -12.263 -13.811 
3 10.187 0.000 -15.411 -14.870 -15.192 Poland 
4 10.678 0.000 -15.374 -14.672 -15.089 0 - 0.000 -2.192 -2.128 -2.166 
Czech Republic 1 1292.69 0.000 -11.853 -11.596 -11.748 
0 - 0.000 -4.622 -4.558 -4.596 2 51.486 0.000* -12.119* -11.670* -11.937* 
1 1197.06 0.000 -13.558 -13.301 -13.454 3 15.655 0.000 -12.111 -11.469 -11.850 
2 62.630 0.000* -13.911* -13.462* -13.729* 4 4.091 0.000 -12.012 -11.177 -11.673 
3 11.006 0.000 -13.866 -13.224 -13.605 5 23.566 0.000 -12.076 -11.048 -11.658 
4 13.568 0.000 -13.844 -13.009 -13.505 6 18.156* 0.000 -12.099 -10.878 -11.603 
5 16.744 0.000 -13.852 -12.824 -13.434 7 8.071 0.000 -12.037 -10.624 -11.463 
6 11.905 0.000 -13.821 -12.600 -13.325 8 8.996 0.000 -11.986 -10.380 -11.333 
7 15.211 0.000 -13.822 -12.409 -13.248 Romania 
8 17.357* 0.000 -13.846 -12.240 -13.193 0 - 0.000 -5.130 -5.025 -5.089 
Hungary 1 332.98* 0.000* -10.776* -10.357* -10.612* 
0 - 0.000 -3.339 -3.275 -3.313 2 15.552 0.000 -10.769 -10.036 -10.483 
1 985.409 0.000 -10.672 -10.415 -10.568 3 5.536 0.000 -10.580 -9.533 -10.170 
2 46.012* 0.000* -10.897* -10.447* -10.714* 4 7.547 0.000 -10.441 -9.079 -9.908 
3 16.093 0.000 -10.892 -10.249 -10.631 Serbia 
4 6.430 0.000 -10.812 -9.977 -10.472 0 - 0.000 -8.020 -7.928 -7.983 
Latvia 1 486.776 0.000 -14.544 -14.176* -14.397 
0 - 0.000 -15.995 -15.908 -15.960 2 27.995 0.000 -14.713 -14.069 -14.455 
1 691.026 0.000 -24.418 -24.071* -24.279* 3 32.351* 0.000* -14.966* -14.046 -14.598* 
2 20.334 0.000* -24.468 -23.860 -24.224 4 7.513 0.000 -14.848 -13.652 -14.370 
3 10.751 0.000 -24.399 -23.531 -24.050 Turkey 
4 15.884 0.000 -24.408 -23.280 -23.955 0 - 0.028 4.953 5.018 4.979 
5 6.991 0.000 -24.297 -22.908 -23.738 1 1312.14 0.000 -4.930 -4.672* -4.825 
6 16.425 0.000 -24.335 -22.686 -23.672 2 39.684 0.000 -5.107 -4.655 -4.923 
7 17.865 0.000 -24.409 -22.499 -23.641 3 20.834 0.000 -5.140 -4.494 -4.878 
8 18.951* 0.000 -24.516 -22.346 -23.644 4 32.618 0.000 -5.274 -4.435 -4.933* 
9 12.110 0.000 -24.518* -22.087 -23.541 5 15.682 0.000 -5.272 -4.239 -4.853 
6 20.051 0.000 -5.312 -4.085 -4.813 
7 7.762 0.000 -5.247 -3.827 -4.670  
8 26.410* 0.000* -5.354* -3.740 -4.698 
 
Notes: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion; LR – sequential modified likelihood ratio test statistic; FPE – 
final prediction error; AIC - Akaike information criterion; SIC - Schwartz information criterion; HQ – Hannah-
Quinn information criterion. 
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Table 3  Cointegration Test Results 
 
Number of 
cointegrating 
equations 
 Eigenvalue Test statistic 
p-
value#  Eigenvalue 
Test 
statistic 
p-
value# 
None 0.119 19.26 0.770 0.195 38.07 0.004** 
At most 1 0.103 10.62 0.586 0.043 8.62 0.409 Trace test 
At most 2 0.047 3.26 0.544 0.019 2.58 0.108 
None 0.119 8.65 0.912 0.195 29.45 0.002** 
At most 1 0.103 7.36 0.633 0.043 6.04 0.614 
Maximum 
eigenvalue 
test 
At most 2 
Belarus 
0.047 3.26 0.543 
Lithuania 
0.019 2.58 0.108 
 Note: Unrestricted constant and 4 lags. Note: Unrestricted constant and 2 lags. 
None 0.248 38.63 0.019* 0.271 29.04 0.200 
At most 1 0.095 12.41 0.421 0.071 7.24 0.876 Trace test 
At most 2 0.035 3.27 0.541 0.031 2.17 0.743 
None 0.248 26.22 0.011* 0.271 21.80 0.057 
At most 1 0.095 9.14 0.431 0.071 5.06 0.873 
Maximum 
eigenvalue 
test 
At most 2 
Bulgaria 
0.035 3.27 0.540 
Macedonia 
0.031 2.17 0.742 
 Note: Restricted constant and 1 lag. Note: Restricted constant and 3 lags. 
None 0.137 36.54 0.034* 0.139 24.48 0.046* 
At most 1 0.039 10.56 0.591 0.027 4.20 0.675 Trace test 
At most 2 0.019 3.47 0.508 0.004 0.55 0.524 
None 0.137 25.98 0.012* 0.139 20.27 0.018* 
At most 1 0.039 7.10 0.663 0.027 3.65 0.684 
Maximum 
eigenvalue 
test 
At most 2 
Croatia 
0.019 3.47 0.507 
Poland 
0.004 0.55 0.518 
 Note: Restricted constant and 8 lags. Note: No constant and 2 lags. 
None 0.133 25.74 0.031* 0.291 27.87 0.084 
At most 1 0.077 9.24 0.156 0.073 7.21 0.560 Trace test 
At most 2 0.000 0.00 0.990 0.043 2.66 0.103 
None 0.133 16.50 0.076 0.291 20.66 0.057 
At most 1 0.077 9.24 0.110 0.073 4.55 0.794 
Maximum 
eigenvalue 
test 
At most 2 
Czech R. 
0.000 0.00 0.988 
Romania 
0.043 2.66 0.103 
 Note: No constant and 7 lags. Note: Unrestricted constant and 2 lags. 
None 0.195 38.08 0.004** 0.164 21.57 0.333 
At most 1 0.058 8.59 0.412 0.117 9.36 0.339 Trace test 
At most 2 0.004 0.53 0.468 0.013 0.91 0.339 
None 0.195 29.49 0.002** 0.164 12.21 0.540 
At most 1 0.058 8.06 0.381 0.117 8.45 0.343 
Maximum 
eigenvalue 
test 
At most 2 
Hungary 
0.004 0.53 0.468 
Serbia 
0.013 0.91 0.339 
 Note: Unrestricted constant and 2 lags. Note: Unrestricted constant and 4 lags. 
None 0.417 45.96 0.002** 0.248 46.27 0.000** 
At most 1 0.157 13.61 0.208 0.067 12.40 0.140 Trace test 
At most 2 0.055 3.38 0.066 0.034 4.16 0.042* 
None 0.417 32.35 0.002** 0.248 33.87 0.000** 
At most 1 0.157 10.24 0.383 0.067 8.25 0.362 
Maximum 
eigenvalue 
test 
At most 2 
Latvia 
0.055 3.38 0.066 
Turkey 
0.034 4.16 0.042* 
 Note: Restricted constant, unrestricted trend and 9 lags. Note: Restricted constant and 6 lags. 
 
Notes: ** denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.01 level; * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level;  
# critical values for p-values can be found in MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999). 
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The Czech Republic has a very high interest rate differential coefficient that we restricted to 
-1. Therefore, an increase of 1 percent in the interest rate differential leads to a 1 percent 
decrease in DE. As explained in Basso, Calvo-Gonzales and Jurgilas (2011), a rise in 
domestic interest rates stimulates domestic currency savings which eventually decreases DE. 
The nominal exchange rate coefficient for the Czech Republic implies the same 
relationship, a moderation in DE after exchange rate depreciation. 
 
Table 4  Cointegrating Vectors 
Country Variable Cointegration vector 
Cointegrating 
vector with 
restrictions 
Country Variable Cointegration vector 
Cointegrating 
vector with 
restrictions 
DE 1 1 DE 1 1 
RER 1.335 0.107 RER 0.136 0.105 
IRD -0.199 -0.073 IRD -0.001 -0.001 
Bulgaria 
Const. -2.716 0 
Latvia 
Const. -0.058 0 
Note: Chi square = 2.5601 [0.1096] Note: Chi square = 0.254 [0.614] 
DE 1 1 DE 1 1 
NER -1.371 -1 NER -3.250 -1 
IRD -0.055 -1 
Lithuania 
IRD -0.086 -0.080 
Croatia 
Const. 1.431 3.397 Note: Chi square = 0.7642 [0.3820] 
Note: Chi square = 3.4030 [0.1824] DE 1 
DE 1 1 NER 1.132 
NER 0.911 1 
Poland 
IRD -0.001 
 
Czech R. 
IRD 0.955 1 Note: No restrictions accepted. 
Note: Chi square = 0.0777 [0.9619] DE 1 1 
DE 1 NER -0.454 -1 
NER -6.936 
Turkey 
IRD -0.014 -0.026 Hungary 
IRD 0.018 
 
Note: Chi square = 2.475 [0.116] 
Note: No restrictions accepted.  
 
Notes: All coefficients are in vector notation; DE – deposit euroization; NER – nominal exchange rate; RER – real 
exchange rate; IRD – interest rate differential. 
 
 
This result is not in accordance with our assumptions about post-transition economies in 
general, but since this is a country with a flexible exchange rate regime, one does not expect 
exchange rate changes exhibiting a strong impact on DE. Another country with a flexible 
exchange rate regime is Poland, with results for the nominal exchange rate very similar to 
the ones explained earlier. A negative coefficient of more than one suggests DE decreases by 
more than 1 percent after a depreciation of 1 percent. The interest rate differential 
coefficient is very small and positive, leading to the conclusion that a larger increase in local 
interest rates relative to interest rates in EMU does increase DE, but very mildly. 
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The Threshold Model 
 
Recall that our threshold adjusted VAR model is specified as: 
 
1 2 *t t t t d ty X X I z z u−= Γ + Γ ≥ +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (11) 
 
where 1(1, ,..., ) 't t t jX y y− −= . However, if we allow for changes in contemporaneous 
relationships between variables, then our transformed model becomes: 
 
1 1 2 2
1 2 1 1 2 1( ) ( ( ) ) *t t t t t t d ty y L y y L y I z z u− − −= Γ + Γ + Γ + Γ ≥ +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . (12) 
 
In this specification, 11Γ  and 21Γ  reflect the “structural” relationship in the two regimes. 
Using Cholesky decomposition and the relevant recursive structure with the causal ordering 
of DE, the exchange rate and the interest rate differential, we are able to identify structural 
errors. Bearing in mind this kind of identification leads to multiple Cholesky factors, we 
consider alternative ordering. However, different ordering choices resulted in very small 
differences. We use this basic form of identification mostly due to simplicity reasons. 
Complicated forms of identifying restrictions, together with robustness analysis of our 
results, are left for future work. 
 
To proceed to the Hansen test we need to closely specify our threshold variable, deposit 
euroization. As in Galbraith and Tkacz (2000), we set the threshold variable t dz −  to be a 
moving average of its past values, or , 1( , ) 1
k
k t d t ii d
z d k DEk d− −== − + ∑  for different values 
of d and k. Based on a minimum residual variance and maximum likelihood, we choose d 
equal to 1 and k equal to 3.9 
 
Bootstrapped p-values for the Hansen test and for the corresponding baseline linear model, 
together with the estimated coefficient for the threshold parameter, can be found in Table 
5. The trimming percentage for the threshold variable is 30 percent and the number of 
bootstrap replications is 1000. It turns out that the chi-square test statistic is significant for 
all countries at the 1 percent level. However, the bootstrap test rejects linearity in a greater 
part of our country sample: Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Serbia 
and Turkey.10 For Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania and Turkey linearity is rejected at the 1 
percent level, and for the other countries at the 5 percent level. It is interesting that both 
the Czech Republic and Poland show no sign of nonlinearity. Among post-transition 
countries in our sample, those two have the lowest level of unofficial euroization, both have 
flexible exchange rate and inflation targeting regimes and both implement policy measures 
to curtail FE. 
 
                                                 
9 However, the deposit euroization variable enters the VAR in its original form. 
10 For the Czech Republic and Macedonia, the linearity is rejected at the 10 percent level only. 
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The estimated threshold values for a VAR model with three lags and the threshold variable 
specified as a three-period moving average with one lag are given in Table 5. Since these 
values are in logarithms and moving averages, we report the corresponding original DE 
values in the last column. We observe that threshold values are country specific and vary 
between 18.8 percent in Hungary and 81.5 percent in Latvia. 
 
Table 5  Estimation of TVAR and Test of Nonlinearity 
Country Estimated threshold Sup F test 
Bootstrapped  
p-value 
Chi-square  
p-value 
Corresponding DE 
(in %) 
Belarus -0.287 41.3653 0.174 0.000 - 
Bulgaria -0.252 46.8602 0.008*** 0.000 56.1 
Croatia -0.125 51.8103 0.007*** 0.000 74.4 
Czech R. -1.011 45.5666 0.054 0.000 - 
Hungary -0.718 47.8170 0.018** 0.000 18.8 
Latvia -0.086 45.3061 0.033** 0.000 81.5 
Lithuania -0.426 53.5303 0.002*** 0.000 37.2 
Macedonia -0.266 37.2685 0.335 0.000 - 
Poland -0.685 40.8365 0.240 0.000 - 
Romania -0.433 41.7328 0.034** 0.000 37.0 
Serbia -0.171 43.8639 0.040** 0.000 67.7 
Turkey -0.383 59.9263 0.000*** 0.000 41.9 
 
Notes: *** null hypothesis about linearity rejected at the 1 percent level of significance; ** hypothesis about linearity 
rejected at the 5 percent level of significance. 
 
 
Figures 1 to 3 directly compare positive and negative shocks with the linear impulse 
response functions. For easier comparison of positive and negative shocks, we transform the 
sign in front of the simulated impulse response after a negative shock.11 Although linear 
responses are misspecified when tests confirm nonlinearity, we leave them as a reference. 
We find clear differences between linear and nonlinear GIRFs and between positive and 
negative shocks in all countries. Further, since differences between regimes are almost 
negligible, due to space considerations, we present GIRFs for low regime only. It is 
important to note that regime differences are observable when there is a natural explanation 
for two states of the endogenous variable. If the endogenous variable is the output gap or 
perhaps credit growth rate, there is reasoning for the existence of a low (negative or 
contractionary) and a high (positive or expansionary) regime. Since DE does not have a 
negative and a positive state (DE is always positive), we simply use it as a threshold variable. 
 
Before discussing the results for all countries and all shocks explored in this study, we 
discuss results for one country and one specific shock in order to explain this rather 
complicated technique. Firstly, the x-axis measures periods, in this case months, while the 
y-axis measures the value of the response to the shock that is set to one standard deviation. 
In cases where the responses to positive and negative shocks differ, this difference is 
                                                 
11 We do not present confidence intervals around impulse responses since there is no consensus on how to compute them 
for nonlinear models that allow regimes to switch (Kilian, 1998). 
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measured on the y-axis. The first graph of Figure 1 presents the cumulative response of DE, 
both positive and negative, to a one-standard-deviation shock in the exchange rate. The 
graph provides evidence of nonlinearities between the effects of positive and negative 
exchange rate shocks on DE in Bulgaria. The response of DE to exchange rate depreciation 
is around 0.0009 after two months and around 0.0022 after six months. However, 
responses to negative exchange rate shocks differ and are around 0.0006 after two months 
and around 0.0014 after six months. These findings show that after two months, positive 
exchange rate changes (depreciations) have a 50 percent stronger impact on DE in Bulgaria 
than do negative exchange rate changes (appreciations). After six months, the difference 
becomes more pronounced since DE has 57 percent stronger responses to positive exchange 
rate changes than to negative ones. The remaining graphs should be interpreted in the same 
manner, but due to space considerations we provide an overall summary of results.  
 
Figure 1  Effect of Positive and Negative (One-Standard Deviation) Exchange Rate Shocks on 
Deposit Euroization 
Bulgaria Croatia 
  
Hungary Latvia 
  
Lithuania Romania 
  
Serbia Turkey 
  
 
Note: Full line represents a positive shock, broken line a negative shock and dotted line a linear response. 
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Figure 1 presents the reaction of DE to exchange rate shocks. Results for Bulgaria, Latvia 
and Romania are in line with economic intuition and indicate DE rises with exchange rate 
depreciation. Moreover, depreciation effects in Bulgaria are stronger than appreciation 
effects in both regimes. Lithuania and Turkey also show stronger responses to depreciation 
in both low and high regimes. DE in Hungary, Lithuania, Serbia and Turkey also reacts as 
one would expect, with a hike preceded by exchange rate depreciation. To summarize, from 
the countries witnessing nonlinear behavior, only Croatia does not corroborate our 
hypothesis that depreciation drives up DE. 
 
Figure 2  Effect of Positive and Negative (One-Standard Deviation) Exchange Rate Shocks on 
Interest Rate Differential 
Bulgaria Croatia 
  
Hungary Latvia 
  
Lithuania Romania 
  
Serbia Turkey 
  
 
Note: Full line represents a positive shock, broken line a negative shock and dotted line a linear response. 
 
 
When depreciation pressures arise, central banks that experience “fear of floating” usually 
react with a liquidity squeeze that eventually manifests itself in a domestic interest rate 
increase. If this theory holds, we would observe a positive response of the interest rate 
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differential to a positive exchange rate shock or depreciation. Interest rate differential 
responses to exchange rate shocks are displayed in Figure 2. We find evidence of the 
described effect in all countries, except in Lithuania. Linear and nonlinear responses are 
very similar in shape, but in six out of eight countries nonlinear responses are stronger. The 
only indication of regime differences is found in Romania where appreciation is much 
stronger in the low regime. The only other case where negative exchange rate shocks appear 
to be stronger is Serbia, while in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Turkey we find clear evidence of 
stronger depreciation effects. 
 
Figure 3  Effect of Positive and Negative (One-Standard Deviation) Interest Rate Differential 
Shocks on Deposit Euroization 
Bulgaria Croatia 
  
Hungary Latvia 
  
Lithuania Romania 
  
Serbia Turkey 
  
 
Note: Full line represents a positive shock, broken line a negative shock and dotted line a linear response. 
 
 
Figure 3 displays DE responses to shocks in the interest rate differential. Although these 
shocks are not our primary goal of research, a few interesting findings can be noted. As in 
Luca and Petrova (2008), we show that DE increases after a positive shock in the interest 
rate differential in six out of eight countries and in five countries positive shocks have 
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stronger effects on DE than negative ones. Only Bulgaria manifests an opposite response, 
while for Latvia it is impossible to detect the direction of the responses.12 
 
The above results imply that exchange rate and interest rate shocks affect deposit 
euroization and play an important role in DE dynamics. Differences in positive and 
negative shocks are evident and in line with the observed deposit euroization behavior in 
our post-transition economies sample. 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
Financial euroization in the European post-transition region has multiple causes, of which 
policy credibility, high inflation, low exchange rate volatility and closeness to the EU are 
the most important ones. In addition, a number of authors stress the influence of foreign 
bank financing and capital inflows as being in large part responsible for FE persistence in 
emerging Europe. Nevertheless, FE is not just a temporary consequence of macroeconomic 
instability experienced in the first period of transition, but a long-lasting phenomenon in 
almost all European post-transition countries. 
 
The latest economic crisis, aggravated by large currency depreciations in some countries 
and massive defending of hard pegs in others, emphasized the severity of high FE. In the 
last few years, a need to deeuroize has grown and European as well as national policy-
makers are coming out with policy recommendations more frequently. Since any 
deeuroization policy will have success only if the determinants of FE are correctly specified, 
we find it necessary to start FE analysis by detecting its determinants. Results of this study 
show what the monetary determinants of deposit euroization are in European post-
transition economies and describe the nonlinear relationships between them. 
 
Cointegration analysis results suggest that monetary variables influence DE considerably 
and that some countries experience an increase in their DE levels after exchange rate 
depreciations occur. The only two countries in our sample with flexible exchange rates, i.e., 
the Czech Republic and Poland, show just the opposite and speak in favor of flexible 
exchange rate regimes. Since TVAR methodology implies that linear results are not 
misspecified only for the Czech Republic and Poland, for other countries one should 
interpret only nonlinear analysis results. Although regime switching is significant in a small 
number of cases, the differences in the sign of shocks are obvious and in line with the 
observed DE behavior. In seven out of eight countries, depreciations have a stronger effect 
on DE than appreciations, showing clear signs of nonlinear behavior. That interest rate 
differentials widen by a greater amount after depreciations is also confirmed in seven out of 
eight countries. Both results indicate foreign currency deposits react unfavorably to 
exchange rate depreciations since they increase when compared to domestic currency 
deposits. Although one would expect that a rise in domestic interest rates relative to euro 
                                                 
12 We find no evidence of threshold behavior for Belarus, the Czech Republic, Macedonia and Poland. 
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rates would decrease DE levels, it does just the opposite. In six out of eight countries, we 
find evidence that DE changes more strongly after interest rate spread widening than 
interest rate spread narrowing. 
 
These results form suggestions for an optimal set of policy recommendations aimed at 
curbing DE in post-transition Europe. The most simple exit strategy would be to adopt the 
euro, but that scenario is becoming less and less likely for some countries due to difficulties 
in reaching the Maastricht criteria. For countries that have already fixed their exchange rate 
like Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria, this seems to be the most possible scenario. The path 
these countries are supposed to follow is achieving convergence (by fiscal consolidation and 
structural reforms) and eventually adopting the euro as their official currency. Countries 
that are too far from adopting the euro and have already exhausted a great deal of 
regulatory measures in fighting DE like Croatia, Hungary and Romania, but to some 
extent also Serbia and Turkey, will probably have to rely on measures other than in the 
regulatory sphere because managing euroization risks is already becoming unsustainable. 
Their only alternative is to decrease DE by using different types of measures. Zettelmeyer, 
Nagy and Jeffrey (2010) suggest that countries should go through a reform of 
macroeconomic regimes and institutions in order to increase macroeconomic and 
institutional credibility. Experience from Latin American countries shows that those 
policies are usually based on inflation targeting and floating exchange rate regimes. A 
contribution to that argument is made by countries like the Czech Republic and Poland 
that already have a tradition of such policies and as a result exhibit the lowest DE levels. 
 
Our study shows that exchange rates and interest rate differentials have an important 
influence on DE in emerging Europe. Therefore, it would be justifiable to introduce 
insurance measures for investors saving in domestic currency. In practice, that implies 
allowing investors to hedge against domestic currency interest rate risk and developing and 
deepening domestic money and capital markets. Some kind of preferential treatment for 
domestic currency savings is also a possible solution for encouraging savings in local 
currency. One must keep in mind that these market development measures are plausible 
only in countries with strong institutional frameworks. This indicates that country-specific 
characteristics should be taken into account when designing deeuroization strategies. 
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Appendix I 
 
DE Levels and Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
Country 
Exchange rate 
regime 
Average DE level in 
the sample period 
DE development 
Belarus Pegged within horizontal bands 57.20% 
 
47%
54%
61%
68%
75%
Jan-04 Jan-10  
Bulgaria Currency board 55.45% 
 
50%
53%
56%
59%
Jan-03 Jan-09  
Croatia Stabilized arrangement 80.00% 
 
64%
71%
78%
85%
Jul-95 Jul-01 Jul-07  
Czech 
Republic 
Free float 11.06% 
 
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
Jan-99 Jan-05  
Hungary Managed float 21.65% 
 
15%
18%
21%
24%
27%
Jan-99 Jan-05  
Latvia Pegged to euro 77.63% 
 
70%
74%
78%
82%
Jan-02 Jan-08  
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Lithuania Currency board 31.00% 
 
20%
27%
34%
41%
Jan-99 Jan-05  
Macedonia Stabilized arrangement 51.21% 
 
43%
47%
51%
55%
59%
Jan-05  
Poland Free float 20.48% 
 
17%
20%
23%
Jan-99 Jan-05  
Romania Managed float 37.42% 
 
32%
35%
38%
41%
May-05  
Serbia Managed float 67.41% 
 
60%
64%
68%
72%
76%
Jan-04 Jan-10  
Turkey Free float 40.39% 
 
28%
36%
44%
52%
Jan-99 Jan-05  
 
Source: See Appendix II. 
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Appendix II 
 
Data Sources and Transformations 
 
Variable Source Description 
Deposit 
euroization 
index 
National authorities 
(central banks) and 
own calculations 
Share of foreign currency deposits (where possible, we add deposits 
indexed to the foreign currency as well) in total deposits. 
Nominal and 
real effective 
exchange rate 
National authorities 
(central banks) and 
Eurostat 
Average monthly nominal or real effective exchange rate of the 
domestic currency to the euro. 
Interest rate 
differential 
National authorities 
(central banks), 
Eurostat and own 
calculations 
Calculated as the difference between interest rates for a respective 
country and the euro rate. For the euro rate and for some of the 
national interest rates, interbank 3-month money market interest rates 
are used. Where not possible, average short-term interest rates on 
deposits are used. The unit of measure is a percentage point. 
 
 
Appendix III 
 
GIRF Algorithm 
 
This method of calculating impulse response functions for nonlinear models follows Koop, 
Pesaran and Potter (1996). GIRF is defined as a response of a specific variable after a one-
time shock hits the forecast of variables in the model. To measure the response of the 
variable we must compare it against a case in which no shocks occur. Mathematically, this 
formulation can be expressed as: 
 
1 1 1( , , ) | , |y t t t m t t t m tGIRF m E y E yε ε− + − + −Ω = Ω − Ω⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (A1) 
 
with m  the forecast horizon, tε  the shock and 1t−Ω  the initial values of the variables 
included in the model. The procedure assumes that the nonlinear k-dimensional model is 
known and requires GIRF is computed by simulating the model. The shock of one 
standard deviation occurs to the i-th  variable ( =1,...,i k ) of ty  (defined earlier as 
( ) '1 ,...,t t kty y y= ) in period 0 with responses calculated for p  periods thereafter. The 
algorithm is as follows: 
 
1. Pick a history 1rt−Ω  (where 1,...,r R= ) that refers to an actual value of the lagged 
endogenous variable at a particular date r . Since R  relates to the values corresponding 
to the regime, the algorithm has to be carried out twice, for both lower and upper 
regimes.  
 
2. Pick a sequence of k-dimensional shocks bt mε +  with 0,...,m p=  and 1,...,b B= . These 
shocks are generated by taking bootstrap samples from the estimated residuals of the 
TVAR model. 
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3. Using 1rt−Ω  and bt mε +  simulate the evolution of t my +  over 1p +  periods. The resulting 
baseline path is given by 1( , )
r b
t m t t my ε+ − +Ω . 
 
4. Substitute 0iε  for the 0i  element of bt mε +  and simulate the evolution of t my +  over 
1p +  periods. In this manner you modify the path of y  and by simulating over m  
periods you get the shocked path 1( , )
r b
t m t t my ε+ − +Ω  for 0,1,...,m p= . 
 
5. Repeat steps 2 to 4 B times to get B estimates of the baseline and the shocked path. 
 
6. Take the average over the difference of the B estimates of the baseline and the shocked 
path. This average will give you an estimate of the expectation y for a given history 
1Ω
r
t− . 
 
7. Repeat steps 1 to 6 R times, that is, over all possible histories. 
 
8. Calculate the average GIRF for a given regime with R observations using the following 
equation: 
 
0 1 1
0
( , , ) ( , )
( )
r b r b
t m i t t m t m t t m
t m i
y y
y
BR
ε ε εε + − + + − ++
⎡ ⎤Ω − Ω⎣ ⎦=  (A2) 
 
As in Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996), B was set to 100 and R to 500.  
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